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mathematically ‘sharp and clean’
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The starting point of the present paper is Bell’s notion of local causality and his own sharpening
of it so as to provide for mathematical formalisation. Starting with Norsen’s (2007 [15], 2009 [16])
analysis of this formalisation, it is subjected to a critique that reveals two crucial aspects that have
so far not been properly taken into account. These are (i) the correct understanding of the notions of
sufficiency, completeness and redundancy involved; and (ii) the fact that the apparatus settings and
measurement outcomes have very different theoretical roles in the candidate theories under study.
Both aspects are not adequately incorporated in the standard formalisation, and we will therefore
do so. The upshot of our analysis is a more detailed, sharp and clean mathematical expression of
the condition of local causality. A preliminary analysis of the repercussions of our proposal shows
that it is able to locate exactly where and how the notions of locality and causality are involved in
formalising Bell’s condition of local causality.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ud
Now it is precisely in cleaning up intuitive
ideas for mathematics that one is likely to
throw out the baby with the bathwater.
J.S. Bell (1990) [9, p. 106]
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the existence of many mathematically precise re-
sults concerning Bell’s theorem, there continues to be
controversy over just what the ingredients of the theorem
are, and what the theorem together with the experiments
confirming a violation of a Bell-inequality rules out. This
is especially so with regard the locality and causality re-
quirements involved. Although recently great progress
has been achieved in clarifying Bell’s theorem and the
crucial notions and assumptions involved1, we still be-
lieve there to be a crucial gap left open. This paper,
which is still work in progress, tries to fill in this gap.
In section II we will present the intuitive notion of
local causality and the way Bell himself further sharp-
ened it so as to allow for mathematical formalisation. In
section III Bell’s formalisation of local causality will be
commented on using the illuminating papers by Norsen
(2007, [15], 2009 [16]). We will closely follow Norsen’s
∗ m.p.seevinck@science.ru.nl
1 For example, see Cavalcanti (2008, [11]), Norsen (2007 [15], 2009
[16]), Seevinck (2008 [17]).
analysis2 but in doing so we will unearth two novel and
crucial aspects that have not yet been adequately incor-
porated in the standard formalisation. Firstly, section
IIIA indicates the intricate relationship of the notions of
sufficiency, completeness and redundancy involved. Sec-
ondly, the very different theoretical role of settings and
outcomes in the candidate theories under study is argued
for in section III B. The latter can be rather easily per-
formed but the first needs a rather extensive discussion.
This is performed in section IV, and which gives a mathe-
matical account of the two different notions of sufficiency
that are in play. It will use an important source of in-
spiration that has been overlooked in the debate so far.
Namely, it will be argued that the concept of sufficiency,
first formulated by R.A. Fisher (1922 [13]) in the context
of mathematical statistics throws a relevant light on this
debate.
Next, the tools obtained in the course of our analy-
sis are used in section V to finally give a mathemati-
cally sharp and clean formulation of Bell’s notion of local
causality. In section VI the novel mathematical formali-
sation is analysed and it is precisely indicated where and
how the notions of locality and causality are involved.
Section VII marks the end of this paper by indicating
that, indeed, the present paper is still work in progress,
as the repercussions of our mathematical formalisation
of Bell’s notion of local causality need still to be fully
charted and confronted to those of other similar analy-
sis3.
2 Parts of the present paper merely rehearse aspects of Norsen’s
analysis. See foonote 9 for the reason of doing so.
3 This we hope to do in the near future (Seevink & Uffink, 2010,
[18]).
2II. THE INTUITIVE IDEA: BELL’S LOCAL
CAUSALITY
In the section entitled ‘Principle of local causality’ of the
very last article Bell wrote on the foundations of quan-
tum theory (published in 1990 and entitled ’La Nouvelle
Cuisine’ [9]), Bell begins his explanation of the principle
of local causality as follows:4
“The direct causes (and effects) of events are
near by, and even the indirect causes (and ef-
fects) are no further away than permitted by
the velocity of light.” Bell (1990) [9, p. 105]
1
effects
causes
FIG. 1. “Space-time location of causes and effects of events in
region 1.” Figure (slightly modified) and caption taken from
Bell (1990 [9, p. 105]).
This locates the causes operating in a certain region in
space-time in the backward light cone of that region and
effects of anything occuring in that region in its forward
light cone. See Fig. 1. But Bell remarks, the “[t]he above
principle is not yet sufficiently sharp and clean for math-
ematics”. He then continues (see Fig. 2):
21
3
FIG. 2. “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the-
ory.” Figure and caption taken from Bell (1990) [9, p. 105].
4 Here we will mainly focus on Bell’s formulation of this principle
as presented in ’La Nouvelle Cuisine’, Bell (1990) [9]. This pre-
sentation we take to be the most definite and precise one Bell
ever presented; it is overall consistent with earlier formulations
Bell used to indicate this principle. See Norsen (2007) [15] for
further elaboration and support of this claim.
“A theory is said to be locally causal if the
probabilities attached to values of local be-
ables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered by
a specification of values of local beables in a
space-like separated region 2 when what hap-
pens in the backward light cone is already suf-
ficiently specified, for example by a full speci-
fication of local beables in a spacetime region
3. It is important that region 3 completely
shields off from 1 the overlap of the backward
light cones of 1 and 2. And it is important
th at events 3 be specified completely. Other-
wise the traces in region 2 of causes of events
in 1 could well supplement whatever else was
being used for calculating probabilities about
1. The hypothesis is that any such informa-
tion about 2 becomes redundant when 3 is
specified completely.” Bell (1990) [9, p. 106]
Although this formulation is considerably sharper, it
is not yet cleanly formulated in terms of mathematics.
Probably for this reason Bell introduces some further no-
tation and terminology in a subsequent discussion. He in
effect introduces the space-time diagram of Fig. 3 that
is adapted5 from Norsen’s (2009) [16] highly illuminating
paper.
b
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FIG. 3. Space-time diagram of the setup Bell considers. For
explanation, see text. Figure adapted from Norsen (2009)
[16].
This diagram encodes the setup Bell considers. It in-
volves measurement on a bi-partite system (e.g., two par-
ticles emitted by a source) where each part is measured
by a different party, called Alice and Bob respectively.
The outcomes of measurement are represented by be-
ables A (in region 1) and B (in region 2) and the settings
chosen by experimenters Alice and Bob are denoted by
beables a and b respectively. The symbol λ indicates the
specification of the state of the bipartite system under
study together with other relevant beables in the space-
time regions 3a and 3b.
The logic is now as follows. Consider a candidate the-
ory that attempts to describe any correlations found be-
tween outcomes A and B. Suppose region 3a shields off
region 1 from the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and
5 See footnote 6.
32, and, likewise, that region 3b shields off region 2 from
the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3).
It is assumed that (in this candidate theory under study)
λ constitutes a complete specification6 of the beables in
region 3a and 3b.
With all this implicitly in place, Bell continues and
applies his principle of local causality to this setup:
“Invoking local causality, and the assumed
completeness of . . .λ . . . we declare redun-
dant certain of the conditional variables in
the last expression because they are at space-
like separation from the result in question.”
Bell (1990)[9, p. 109]
Thus the specification of λmakes both B and b redundant
for prediction about A, and both A and a redundant for
prediction about B.
This finally allows for a clean formulation in mathe-
matics of the principle. For now we follow Norsen (2007)
[15] in claiming that this indeed gives (but, see our cri-
tique later on)
P (A|a, b, B, λ) = P (A|a, λ) ,
P (B|a, b, A, λ) = P (B|b, λ) , (1)
i.e., the conditional probability of obtaining A is inde-
pendent of both B and b given the specification λ and
a, and analogous for the probability of obtaining B. Us-
ing the definition of conditional probability one trivially
obtains the condition
P (A,B|a, b, λ) = P (A|a, λ)P (B|b, λ) , (2)
i.e., the joint probability for obtaining outcomes A and
B factorizes into a product of individual probabilities
for the two spatially separated systems, with each fac-
tor containing conditionalization only on local beables.
This well-known factorisation condition is thus derived
from the principle of local causality, just as Bell himself
stressed7.
In the following we will subject this reasoning and
mathematical formalisation to a critique. We believe that
Bell’s qualitative statement in the long quote above can
benefit greatly from a more refined and detailed mathe-
matical discussion than available in the literature, espe-
cially concerning (i) the understanding of the notions of
6 Norsen (2007 [15], 2009 [16]) requires that such a complete spec-
ification of region 3a and 3b not only includes λ but also the
setting a in region 3a and setting b in region 3b, respectively.
For this purpose he has appropriately located the spacetime lo-
cation of settings to overlap with region 3 in Fig. 3. We believe,
however, that this need not be done, and in fact should not be
done. In remark (two) on page 12 this is further explained.
7 “Very often such factorizability is taken as the starting point
of the analysis. Here we have preferred to see it not as the
formulation of “local causality”, but as a consequence thereof.”
Bell (1990) [9, p. 109]
sufficiency, completeness and redundancy involved; and
(ii) the fact that the settings a, b and outcomes A,B have
very different theoretical roles in the candidate theories
under study, something which, we will argue, is not ade-
quately reflected in the reasoning leading up to (1). The
upshot of our critique is a more detailed, sharp and clean
mathematical expression of local causality. It will fur-
thermore be shown8 that this pays off when interpreting
this condition.
III. CLEANING UP THE INTUITIVE IDEA
Let us first comment on some crucial aspects of Bell’s
formulation of local causality, most of which can already
be found in the literature9. Here we will be deliberately
short because our main point lies elsewhere as will soon
become clear. When possible we will quote Bell so as to
let the ‘master speak for himself’. For a more detailed
discusion of these points, see more of Bell himself (Bell,
1976 [2], 1977 [3], 1981 [5], 1990 [9]), and especially
Norsen (2007 [15], 2009 [16]).
(i) It is important to note that the condition of
local causality is only intended to be a constraint on
candidate theories, and not on the real world. Indeed,
Bell starts by writing: “A theory is said to be locally
causal if . . . ” [emphasis added]. Furthermore, as Norsen
(2009, [16]) has pointed out, Bell has emphasized this
point very clearly in (Bell, 1977 [8, p. 101]):
“I would insist here on the distinction be-
tween analyzing various physical theories, on
the one hand, and philosophising about the
unique real world on the other hand. In this
matter of causality it is a great inconvenience
that the real world is given to us once only.
We cannot know what would have happened
if something had been different. We cannot
repeat an experiment changing just one vari-
able; the hands of the clock will have moved,
and the moons of Jupiter. Physical theories
are more amenable in this respect. We can
calculate the consequences of changing free
elements in a theory, be they only initial con-
ditions, and so can explore the causal struc-
ture of the theory. I insist that [local causal-
ity] is primarily an analysis of certain kinds
of physical theory.”
Note that the fundamental concepts involved such as
‘beables’, ‘completeness’, and ‘free variables’ are all
8 Here only a preliminary investigation of this is worked out. A full
analysis of the repercussions of our proposal is to be presented
in future work, see Seevinck & Uffink (2010, [18]).
9 Nevertheless, most of these aspects are not well-known nor gen-
erally appreciated by commentators. It is thus worthwhile men-
tioning them here.
4relative to some particular candidate theory. This will
be become clear next.
(ii) Bell uses the term ‘beable’ to denote what-
ever is posited by the candidate theory to correspond to
something physically real:
“The beables of the theory are those elements
which might correspond to elements of reality,
to things which exist. Their existence does
not depend on observation. Indeed observa-
tion and observers must be made out of be-
ables. I use the term ‘beable’ rather than
some more committed term like ‘being’ or
‘beer’ to recall the essentially tentative na-
ture of any physical theory. Such a theory
is at best a candidate for the description of
nature. Terms like ‘being’, ‘beer’, ‘existent’,
etc., would seem to me lacking in humility. In
fact ‘beable’ is short for maybe-able’.” (Bell,
1984 [8, p. 174])
The concept ‘beable’ is thus theory-relative, and it
is important that the candidate theory in question is
absolutely clear about what it posits as physically real
(Norsen, 2007 [15]). Indeed, Bell emphasizes ‘. . . you
must identify in your theory ‘local beables’. The beables
of the theory are those entities in it which are, at least
tentatively, to be taken seriously, as corresponding
to something real.” (Bell, 1990, [9, p. 100 ]). And,
”[i]t is in terms of local beables that we can hope to
formulate some notion of local causality.” (Bell, 1976,
[8, p. 53]). When applied to our particular setup of
Fig. 3 this implies that the candidate theory in question
must provide a well-specified account of the beables λ
in region 3. It should be noted that λ is not resticted
in any way, as it can be anything the theory posits
as physically real. In particular λ need not be some
classical hidden variable.
(iii) It is important that in Fig. 2 “[r]egion 3
completely shields off from 1 the overlap of the backward
light cones of 1 and 2.” (Bell, 1990 [9, p. 106]). Likewise,
in the paradigmatic setup of Fig. 3 it is necessary that
region 3a shields off region 1 from the overlap of the
backward light cones of 1 and 2, and, analogously,
region 3b shields off region 2 from the overlap of the
backward light cones of 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3). Why? For
if this was not the case, such as for region 3′ in Fig. 4,
then a violation of (1) fails to indicate the presence of
some sort of non-local causation. In short, consider for
example an event ×3 in Fig. 4 located in the overlap
of the backward light cones of regions 1 and 2 but in
the forward light cone of region 3′. Since ×3 lies in the
overlap of the backward light cones of regions 1 and 2,
it can influence both A and B. Now suppose ×3 is a
genuinely stochastic event, not predictable on the basis
of the beables in region 3′, then specification of events in
region 2 could tell about ×3, which in turn, could allow
one to infer more about the events in 1 than is possible
from just the original specification of 3′.
The condition (1) with region 3 replaced by region 3′
–to be called called (1′)– would exclude any correlation
between events b, B and the outcome A, given a and λ.
But a failure of this condition could be perfectly com-
patible with local causality. Thus although (1′) “may
validly be described as a “no correlations” condition for
regions 1 and 2, it definitely fails as a “no-causality”
condition.” (Norsen, 2007, [15, p. 12]).
BA
×1
×2
×3
4
λ
′
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b
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′
FIG. 4. Alternative space-time diagram of the Bell-type
setup. For explanation, see text, and compare to Fig. 3.
Figure adapted from Norsen (2009) [16].
(iv) Bell takes it to be a trivial point that be-
sides λ, both the settings a, b and the outcomes A,B are
also beables10: “The beables must include the settings of
switches and knobs on experimental equipment [settings]
. . . and the readings of intruments [outcomes].” (Bell,
1975, [8, p. 52]. Indeed, the settings correspond to the
controllable part of some measurement apparatus and
the outcomes can be taken to be manifested by the final
position of some pointer (or something similar, such as
a black spot on a photograph, etc.) and these are all
beables as they must, in any serious candidate theory,
correspond to “something physically real” (Bell, 1990 [9,
p. 100]).
Thus, “[the] “setting” ultimately comes down to the
spatial configuration of some physically real matter, [and]
. . . the outcome too is just a convenient way of referring
to some physically real and directly observable configu-
ration of matter, and so [these too] will necessarily be
reflected in the beables posited by any serious candidate
theory.” (Norsen, 2009 [16, p. 5]).
There is, however, also a very important difference be-
tween settings and outcomes that breaks the symmetry
described above. This is a consequence of the fact that, in
contradistinction to the outcomes, the settings are sup-
posed11 to be uncorrelated to the beables λ. The rea-
10 A point also made by Hans Westman, private communication.
11 This requirement is crucial in deriving the so-called Bell-type
inequalities that are used to proof Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964
5son being that “Now we make an important hypothesis:
The variables a and b can be considered to be free12, or
random.” (Bell, 1990, [9, p. 109]). Bell continues: “we
can imagine these settings being freely chosen at the last
second by two different experimental physicists, or some
other random devices. If these last second choices are
truely random, they are not influenced by the variables
λ. Then the resultant values for a and b do not give any
information about λ. So the probability distribution over
λ does not depend on a or b”, i.e.,
ρ(λ|a, b) = ρ(λ). (3)
with ρ some density.
This ‘free variables’ assumption has the important
repercussion that, despite the fact that from a physical
point of view outcomes and settings are nothing but
beables, they do have a completely different theoretical
role to play in the candidate theories in question. In the
literature this crucial difference has not been correctly
incorporated in the mathematical formalisation of Bell’s
notion of local causality. One of the main points of the
present paper is that this will be performed here (in
section III B and beyond).
(v) Consider the settings a′ and b′ that are lo-
cated in region 4 of Fig. 4. Since region 3′ (just like
region 3 of Fig. 3, by the way) shields off both region
1 and 2 from the settings a′ and b′ that are located in
region 4, we expect that if indeed the beables λ′ in region
3′ are completely specified that the beables of region 4
would be redundant for prediction of events in region 1
or 2. The reason being that local causality is supposed
to enforce that a complete specification of λ′ renders the
events in the backward light cone of region 3′ redundant
for predictions of events in the future light cone of 3′.
Indeed, this is precisely what Bell’s intuitive formulation
claims (see the very first quote by Bell in section II,
and also Fig. 1). Therefore, under this understanding of
local causality, and where we take λ′ to be completely
specified, we expect that (1) reduces to
P (A|a′, b′, λ′) = P (A|λ′) ,
P (B|a′, b′, λ′) = P (B|λ′) . (4)
However, this ignores the fact that the settings a′ and
b′ are by assumption independent of the beables λ′ of re-
gion 3′ (see the remark (iv) above). Therefore, if one
takes this into account, we expect the most complete
specification of λ′ not to shield off from region 1 and
2 the causal influences a′ and b′ have on these regions.
Thus, we in fact expect (4) to be violated, i.e., both
a′ and b′ could very well (in a locally causal way) sup-
ply information about both A and B that is not already
[1]).
12 Bell also calls them “free variables – say at the whim of experi-
menters”. (Bell, 1976 [8, p. 61])
contained in λ′. Yet, since a′, b′ lie in the backward light
cone of both region 1 and 2 this would in no way indicate
non-local causation.
In order to exclude such spurious violations of (1) it
must be the case that the settings should be spacelike
separated and outside the overlap of the backward light
cones of regions 1 and 2 (i.e., outside region 4 in Fig. 4),
and in most discussions this is indeed the case, e.g., in
Fig. 3.
Note that the main point here is not to argue for the
settings to be located as in Fig. 3 rather than as in Fig.
4 –for that is a rather obvious13 if one wants to test local
causality–, but that this is necessary to exclude spurious
violations of (1).
(vi) The previous remark (i.e., (v)) serves as a
starter for the following subsequent discussion. For
that remark shows not only that settings should have
a very particular space-time configuration in a sound
formulation of local causality, it also indicates that the
supposition that λ′ could be a complete specification of
the beables in region 3′ of Fig. 4 is an illusion; and the
same holds for λ in region 3 of Fig. 3. This is explained
next.
Indeed, we can not but give up the idea that λ is a com-
plete specification of beables in region 3, for otherwise
“one wonders how a and b could possibly not be causally
influenced by λ (in a locally causal theory).”(Norsen,
2009 [16, p. 283]). In other words, λ cannot be ex-
pected to be a complete specification of region 3 because
one must allow for the possibility of traces in region 3 of
the causal past of both the settings, and given the inde-
pendence of λ and the settings, these traces cannot be
included in λ14.
An alternative understanding of this point is that one
is here faced with a dilemma. That is, the following two
assumptions cannot both hold: (i) the free variables as-
sumption, and (ii) the assumption that λ is completely
specified, i.e., contains the description of all and every
beable in region 3. However, this dilemma can in fact
be avoided. Because, luckily, there is no need for a com-
13 The settings a,b need not lie in the forward light cone of region
3, all that is necessary is that they lie outside the overlap of the
backward light cones of region 1 and 2.
14 “For example, some candidate theory (and this is actually true
of every serious extant candidate theory) might provide a spec-
ification of the state of the particle pair which is sufficient in
the relevant sense, even though it leaves out some fact (say, the
millionth digit of the energy of some relic microwave background
photon that happens to fly into the detection region just prior
to the measurement) which actually exists in the relevant space-
time region. Such a fact could then be allowed to determine
the setting a without introducing even the slightest evidence for
the problematic sort of correlation between a and λ. Indeed,
this is just an exaggerated version of what happens in the actual
experiments, where carefully-isolated and independent pseudo-
random-number generators are used to produce the settings at
the two stations.” (Norsen, 2009, [16, p. 283])
6pleteness requirement when formalising the notion of lo-
cal causality. It is only needed that the specification is
sufficiently specified, in the relevant sense. This will be
futher worked out in the next subsection.
Although Bell seemed to be aware of the crucial dis-
tinction between a sufficient and complete specification of
the beables involved (see next subsection), he neverthe-
less repeatedly15 stressed the need for λ to be a complete
specification of the beables in region 3. The reason for
this is the following.
Suppose the events in region 3 are not completely spec-
ified, i.e., λ leaves out some relevant beables. Then a vi-
olation of (1) can no longer be used to infer some sort of
non-local causation, for it could well be that the beables
excluded from λ influence both regions 1 and 2 in a locally
causal way such that correlations between 1 and 2 can no
longer be explained by an appeal to λ alone. In order to
exclude such spurious violations of (1), Bell requires the
specification of region 3 by λ to be complete. Norsen
(2007, [15, p. 8]) emphasizes that the key assumption by
Bell is that events be specified completely16: ”It is only
because λ is assumed to be a complete description, that
the non-dependence of the probability of A on the distant
outcome B follows from local causality.”
One final remark concerning the completeness (or
sufficiency; see next subsection) that is at stake. This
notion is not to be understood in the sense of the
true maximal amount of knowledge concerning the
systems under study. To the contrary, it is relative
with respect to possible candidate theories. Therefore,
the question whether the candidate theory in question
is complete in the sense of including ‘all that really
exists’ is not at stake (there is no need for ‘omniscience’,
see Norsen (2007, [15, p. 8]). It thus is the candidate
theory in question that should indicate when the desired
completeness (or sufficiency) is achieved.
——
15 Most notably this is the case in the formulation of local causality
as given in section II above: “And it is important that events 3 be
specified completely.” (Bell 1990 [9, p.106]), and ”Invoking local
causality and the assumed completeness of c and λ, . . . ”(Ibid,
p. 109). But also already in 1975 in ‘The theory of local be-
ables’ Bell requires this form of completeness: “However, in the
particular case that [λ] contains already a complete specification
of beables in the overlap of the two light cones, supplementary
information from region 2 could reasonable be expected to be
redundant.” (Bell, 1975, [8, p. 54]). And in ‘EPR correlations
and EPW distributions’, Bell writes: “In a locally-causal theory,
probabilities attached to values of local beables in one space-time
region, when values are specified for all local beables in a second
space-time region fully obstructing the backward light cone of
the first, are unaltered by specification of values of local beables
in a third region with spacelike separation from the first two.”
(Bell, 1986, [8, p. 200]).
16 But in a different paper Norsen (2009, [16]) mentions that,
strictly speaking, such a form of completeness is not at all needed.
See next subsection where this is discussed.
The remarks (iv) and (vi) indicate that crucial ele-
ments of Bell’s condition of local causality have escaped
careful mathematical formalisation. Most notably, the
theoretical distinctions between settings and outcomes
and between the notions of sufficiency and completeness
have as of yet not been properly implemented.
In the next two subsections these two issues are to be
further worked out so as to provide the means for a clean
and sharp mathematical formalisation of the notions at
stake; something which is to be undertaken in section
IV. This fills in the gap that was left untouched in the
analysis of others, notably the careful analysis by Norsen
(2007 [15], 2009 [16]).
A. On sufficiency and completeness
The above remarks (v) and (vi) indicate that λ cannot
be expected to be a complete specification of region 3
because one must allow for the possibility of traces in
region 3 of the causal past of the settings, and given the
independence of λ and the settings, these traces cannot
be included in λ (see footnote 14).
Bell seems to account for this by indicating, in his for-
mulation of local causality as given in section II, that
the specification must be “sufficiently specified, for ex-
ample by a full specification of local beables” [emphasis
added]. Indeed, a complete specification is not necessary,
but merely sufficient to interpret (1) as a condition of lo-
cal causality. However, and this is the main point, we
have just seen that such a “complete specification” is not
an option. It is the “sufficient specification” that can at
most be required. We must thus focus our mathematical
formalisation on this notion of sufficiency.
Although both Bell17 (1990, [9]) and Norsen (2009,
[16]) indicate that completeness is not necessary, but only
sufficient, in the main discussion of the notion of local
causality they nevertheless gloss over this and assume
that λ provides a complete specification of the beables
17 Apart from the citation on page 2 above (“. . . is already suffi-
ciently specified, for example . . . ”), taken from La Nouvelle Cui-
sine (Bell, 1990, [9]), at at least two other occassions Bell men-
tions that the notion of sufficiency is needed when formalising the
notion of local causality: “Consider, then, the hypothesis that
A and B fluctuate independently when the relevant causal fac-
tors, at time T −δ−ǫ say, whatever they may be, are sufficiently
well specified . . . .” [...]. That is assume there are variables λ and
some probability distribution δ such that (2) holds. [where (2) is:
ρ(A,B|a, b) =
∫ ∫
dλ dµσ(λ, µ)ρ1(A|a, λ)ρ2(B, |b, µ)] (Bell 1980,
[8, p. 106]) [emphasis added]. And, “It seems reasonable to ex-
pect that if sufficiently many such causal factors can be identi-
fied and held fixed, the residual fluctuations will be independent,
i.e., P (M,N |a, b, λ) = P1(M |a, λ)P2(N |b, λ), where [. . . ] λ de-
notes any number of other variables that might be relevant. (Bell
(1981), [8, p. 152] (first emphasis added). However, despite all
this, Bell did not carefully distinguish between these two notions,
and in fact seemed to prefer the requirement of completeness. See
footnote 15 above.
7in region 3. Here we want to avoid this, and therefore
will proceed to give a sound analysis of the notion of
sufficiency involved.
It might be true that “Once one realizes that the no-
tion of a complete specification of beables is relative to a
given candidate theory, there is no further problem un-
derstanding the meaning of “complete” or “full”. . . . But
it is less clear, even given some well defined candidate
theory, what partial specifications of the beables might
be considered “sufficient”.” (Norsen, 2007, [15, p. 16])
and that “[i]n a more careful discussion the notion of
completeness should perhaps be replaced by that of suf-
ficient completeness for a certain accuracy, with certain
epsilonics.” (Bell, 1977, [8, p. 104]). But this is a prac-
tical problem that one encounters when formulating ad-
equate candidate theories; it is not a problem for math-
ematically formalising the notion of local causality. The
reason being that we may assume that a serious candidate
theory provides us with an unambiguous specification of
the causally relevant beables. Otherwise the question of
whether the theory is locally causal does not even come
up18.
Combining the above points, a first crucial observation
is the following. The notion of sufficiency should be rela-
tivized with respect to a specific subclass of all beables in
the candidate theory, namely the subclass of all beables
in a region 3 except for the free variables and the beables
causally related to the latter in that region.
We thus isolate a very important aspect of the notion
of sufficiency involved. It is
(α): relative to a specific class Rλ of beables (i.e., the
beables have a particular space-time specification,
and they need not include all such beables the
theory in fact allows for!).
The next crucial observation comes from considering the
following question: “λ is sufficient for what?” The first
obvious answer may be: sufficient for prediction of out-
come A or B. However, this cannot be true, as the prob-
abilities assigned to region 1 need not be determined by
λ and the settings alone. Let us illustrate this with an
example.
Since we are allowing genuinely stochastic theories
there could be stochastic causal relevant factors above re-
gion 3 and within the backward light cone of 1. Consider
for example some such causal factors located at events ×1
or ×2 in Fig. 4. It is perfectly legitimite19 in a locally
causal theory that these events are allowed to supplement
18 See Norsen (2007, [15, p. 10]) for a similar analysis that shows
that it should be trivial to decide in a given candidate theory
what is and what is not a causal influence. This is endorsed by
Cartwright & Jones (1991, [10, p. 229]) who write ”... but we
take the point to be perfectly general: there are no tests of [local]
causality outside of models which already have significant causal
structure built in.”
19 See Norsen (2009, [16, p. 12]) for an extensive discussion of the
following point: “The claim made in the local causality condition
λ in determining the probabilities of events in regions 1
or 2 respectively, i.e., ×1 influencing region 1 and ×2
influencing region 2.
The correct answer to our question “sufficient for
what?” is that the specification λ should be sufficient for
rendering B and b redundant for the task of specifying the
probability of outcome A occurring. Indeed, Bell writes:
“The hypothesis is that any such information about 2
becomes redundant when 3 is specified completely”. As
we have just seen, ‘completely’ should here be replaced
by ‘sufficient’ or ‘sufficiently complete’.
We thus isolate another very important aspect of the
notion of sufficiency involved. The specification λ should
be sufficient
(β1): for a specific purpose, namely
(β2): to render some other variables redundant for the
task of determining some particular quantity.
In the next section the notion of sufficiency as spelled
out via the requirements α, β1 and β2 will be properly
mathematically formalised. But before we can do so a
final necessary preparatory analysis needs to be presented
in the next subsection.
B. The different theoretical role of
settings and outcomes
In the mathematical formalisation above, (i) the out-
comes A,B, (ii) the beables λ and (iii) the settings a, b
appear as conditioning arguments in a probability dis-
tribution. See e.g. Eq. (1). However, if one treats the
settings a and b as conditioning arguments in a probabil-
ity distribution, this implies, at least in Kolmogorovian
probability theory, that they are random variables, and
thus a probability distribution over their possible values
is defined within the model: one cannot write p(x|y) un-
less p(y) is also defined. In other words, this means that
the candidate theory in question would have to specify
how probable it is that Alice will choose one setting a1
rather than a2, and similarly for Bob and for their joint
choises.
But that would be a remarkable feat for any physi-
cal theory. Even quantum mechanics leaves the question
what measuremtn is going to be performed on a system as
one that is decided outside the theory, and does not spec-
ify how much more probable one measuremeny is than
another. It thus seems reasonable not to require from
the candidate theories that they describe such probabil-
ities. This explains, we hope, the different theoretical
is not that the probabilities assigned (to events in region 1, on
the basis of complete information about region 3) are the “best
possible” probabilities the theory allows. They aren’t. Better
ones might be assigned, e.g., if we move region 3 forward in
time, into the more recent past of region 1.”
8status of settings a, b and random variables A,B, λ. And
lest one should despair that this distinction introduces a
dichotomy not introduced by Bell, we note that Bell also
attributed a special status to a, b by relegating them the
status of ‘free variables’, meaning that their values could
be set or changed at the last instant. See above, section
III, remark (iv). This view, we believe, should also count
as an argument against the presumption that a putative
candidate theory ought to provide their probabilities.
However, above (section III, remark (iv)) it was also
mentioned that from a fundamental point of view both
settings and outcomes are nothing but beables. But we
have just indicated that they have very different roles
in any putative candidate theory we envisage, and this
means that we should not regard them on equal foot-
ing, at least theoretically. Although their ontological (or
physical) status might be the same, their theoretical sta-
tus is not. And this is crucial. Especially since local
causality refers to putative candidate theories only (see
section III, remark (i)). Thus, the difference between
the two must be adequately reflected in any candidate
theory.
Therefore we adopt the following point of view. Out-
comes A,B, as well as the beable specification λ are ran-
dom variables and figure as arguments of a joint proba-
bility distribution Pa,b(A,B, λ) = Pa,b(A,B|λ) ρ(λ). The
measurement settings a, b appear as labels of this proba-
bility function, not as arguments. The fundamental con-
ditional probabilities to be considered are thus
Pa,b(A,B|λ), (5)
instead of Bell’s P (A,B|a, b, λ). Also, Eq. (3) encod-
ing the ‘free variables’ assumption should in fact read:
ρa,b(λ) = ρ(λ).
IV. INTRODUCING MATHEMATICS:
FORMALIZING SUFFICIENCY
Then how are we to mathematically implement Bell’s
idea of ”λ being sufficiently specified so as to de-
clare redundant some of the conditional variables” in
Pa,b(A,B|λ), where the latter are in fact to range over
both the labels a, b and the random variables A,B? This
we will perform next. It is important to realize that
two distinct notions of sufficiency are in play, i.e., where
firstly the label b (or a), and, secondly, the random vari-
able B (or A) becomes redundant for the task of deter-
mining the specific probability to obtain outcome A (or
B). Each of these two notions will be clarified next.
A. Functional sufficiency
The first kind of sufficiency where one of the labels a, b
becomes redundant can be rather easily formalized. Con-
sider a function fx(y) where x labels the different func-
tions fx(y). When variable y is sufficient for the purpose
of declaring x redundant for task of determining the func-
tion fx(y), relative to the class of all y in some specific
range Ry, then, given y the function f does not differ for
different values of x, i.e.,
fx(y) = f(y), ∀y ∈ Ry, ∀x. (6)
This can of course trivially be generalized to func-
tions fx1,x2,...(y1, y2, . . .) that have more than one label
x1, x2, . . ., and more than one argument y1, y2, . . ..
Recall that our preliminary analysis of sufficiency in
section IIIA showed that such a requirement for physical
theories implies that certain variables should be sufficient
for a particular purpose and relative to a specific class of
variables. See the requirements α, β1 and β2 on page
7. This is retained here: y is sufficient for the purpose
of making fx(y) independent of x (thus not sufficient for
determining its value, or for some other purpose), and
this is relative to a specific class, namely to all such y
that lie in a given range Ry.
Applying this condition to the usual Bell-type frame-
work we have been sketching in the previous section is
rather easy. First of all, we will suppose the condi-
tion (6) to hold for each of the probability distributions
Pa,b(A,B|λ), Pa,b(A|B, λ), etc. Secondly, λ will play the
role of y, and thus Rλ the role of Ry, and, thirdly, the
settings a, b play the role of the labels x.
Let us next turn to sufficiency in the case of statisti-
cal dependence P (·|x, y), and that requires considerably
more clarificatory effort.
B. Sufficiency in statistical inference
The concept of sufficiency in the context of the theory of
statistical inference was developed by R.A. Fisher (1922)
[13].
The basic problem of statistical inference may be for-
mulated as follows. Suppose we have some probabilistic
experiment with a fixed set of possible outcomes x ∈ X
and a family of probability distributions pθ, θ ∈ Θ, each
of which provides some candidate description for the ex-
periment. Here, Θ represents some arbitrary index set.
For each value θ ∈ Θ, pθ(x) then provides the probabil-
ity of x to occur. It is assumed however that we do not
know exactly what the correct probability distribution is
for the experiment and the problem is to infer something
about which probability distribution out of the given col-
lection would provide a best “fit” for the experiment on
the basis of recorded outcomes.
It is generally useful to present the problem from a
slightly expanded version, by adding the supposition that
it is possible to repeat the performance of the experiment
under i.i.d conditions (i.e., independent and identically
distributed repeated trials). In that case, assuming one
performs n such trials, the probability of obtaining a se-
9quence (x1, . . . , xn) is
pθ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
pθ(xi). (7)
The goal now becomes to make an inference about θ on
the basis of the outcomes (x1, . . . , xn).
There are many forms in which such an inference could
be casted. For example, it could take the form of a point
estimator, i.e., by designing a function τ : Xn 7→ Θ such
that τ(x1, . . . , xn) would represent the best estimate of
θ. These details need not concern us now because the
concept of sufficiency is equally important in all such
approaches.
To introduce the notion of sufficiency it is useful to
consider a set of n independent functions {y1, . . . , yn}
defined on Xn, such that the equations
y1(x1, . . . , xn) = c1
...
...
yn(x1, . . . , xn) = cn (8)
always have a unique solution. Thus, one might simply
think of (y1, . . . , yn) as an alternative coordinate system
that charts the points in Xn just as well as (x1, . . . , xn).
Clearly, it is then equivalent whether one provides the
recorded data in terms of the original values (x1 . . . , xn)
or in terms of the alternative coordinates (y1, . . . , yn).
The probability distribution can be transformed to the
alternative coordinates:
pˆθ(y1, . . . , yn) = pθ(x1, . . . , xn)|∂xi
∂yj
| (9)
where the last factor represents the Jacobian of the trans-
formation.
Now suppose that pˆθ has the following form
pˆθ(y1, . . . , yn) = pˆθ(y1)g(y1, . . . , yn). (10)
In that case, the function y1 is said to be sufficient for θ.
Of course, there are many choices for such an alterna-
tive coordinate system. It is straightforward to show that
if y1 out of the set {y1, . . . , yn} is sufficient for θ, then,
the same will hold for an alternative set {y1, y˜2, . . . , y˜n},
provided that this also gives a regular coordinate system.
The intuitive idea behind this notion of sufficiency is
that all the information that the data provide about the
unknown value of θ is in this case really contained in
y1 alone, because the probabilities of the values of the
remaining variables y2, . . . , yn are insensitive to θ. In
other words, whatever form our inference about θ is going
to be, it seems reasonable to make it depend only on the
value of y1, since all the other data are irrelevant for this
purpose. Of course, if a sufficient statistic can be found
this greatly simplifies the problem of statistical inference
because the number of relevant data can then be reduced
from n to 1.
In Fisher’s own words, the criterion of sufficiency is:
“That the statistics chosen should summarize
the whole relevant information supplied by
teh sample. [. . . ] In mathematical language
we may interpret this statement by saying
that if θ is the parameter to be estimated, θ1
a statistic which contains the whole of the in-
formation as to the value of θ which the sam-
ple supplies, and θ2 any other statistic, then
the surface of distribution of pairs of values
θ1 and θ2 for a given value of θ is such that
for a given value of θ1, the distribution of θ2
does not involve θ. In other words, when θ1
is known, knowledge of the value of θ2 throws
no further light upon the value of θ.” Fisher
(1922) [13, p. 317].
It might be worthwhile to illustrate this by a simple
example. Suppose we have a real-valued outcome x and a
collection of normal probability distributions which differ
only in their location parameter, e.g.:
pθ(x) =
1√
2pi
e−(x−θ)
2/2 . (11)
It is well-known that for this case, the function
y1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi (12)
provides a sufficient statistic for θ. In general, however,
the class of probability distributions for which a sufficient
statistic exists is severely limited; the Pitman-Koopman
theorem implies they exist only for the exponential fam-
ily.
It useful to slightly rewrite the condition of sufficiency
(10). Using (9), we can rewrite it into pˆθ(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
pˆθ(y1)gˆ(y1, . . . , yn). Next, using the definition of condi-
tional probability this gives
pˆθ(y2, . . . , yn|y1) = gˆ(y1, . . . , yn), (13)
which states that if y1 is sufficient for θ then the condi-
tional probability pˆθ(y2, . . . , yn|y1) must be independent
of θ (because gˆ(y1, . . . , yn) is), and thus
pˆθ(y2, . . . , yn|y1) = pˆ(y2, . . . , yn|y1). (14)
This alternative formulation of sufficiency shows that
once y1 is given, the rest of the data (i.e., {y2, . . . , yn})
is irrelevant to θ.
For our purposes the following notes are of crucial im-
portance. Note firstly that notions of locality or causa-
tion can be kept safely on the bench in this approach.
For example, it might be that θ labels various races of
tomato plants, and x the weight of a tomato produced
by a such a plant.
Secondly, Fisher’s talk about ‘information’ should be
understood in the following sense. It refers to informa-
tion that is ‘contained’ in a sample and that is ‘about’
something. To say that y1 is sufficient is qualified by say-
ing that it is sufficient for a purpose (inferring the value
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of θ, it may well be insufficient for other purposes!) and
relative to a class Ry, namely all other statistics of the
same sample space, i.e., all other functions of y2, . . . , yn
of the outcome space Xn, i.e., Ry = {y1, . . . , yn}.
So we see that this framework naturally incorporates
the two aspects mentioned in subsection IIIA, namely
that sufficiency of λ should be characterised as (i) for a
specific purpose, the purpose beign to render some other
variable redundant and (ii) relevant to a specific class of
variables. See the requirements α, β1 and β2 on page 7.
Finally, some words about its status. In mathemati-
cal statistics, one might feel, sufficiency is actually just
a name for a particular definition. As such, one may
ask, how can this be of any help to foundational or con-
ceptual problems in physics? However, even in statistics
sufficiency is much more than just a definition. It is a
desideratum. But it can be turned into something much
more powerful by formulating the demand that, for cer-
tain physical probabilistic or stochastic theories, certain
variables should be sufficient (in the sense given by the
definition above) for a particular purpose relative a spe-
cific class of variables. To this we will now turn.
1. Bayesian inference
The above approach used the orthodox formulation of
statistical inference, in which parameters are kept strictly
distinct from outcomes. The basic reason for this division
is that while a statistical model provides probabilities for
the events or outcomes x, there is usually not a corre-
sponding probability for parameters, i.e., they are usually
not random variables but labels for the probability dis-
tributions indicating settings of measurement apparata.
At first sight this dichotomy between parameters and
outcomes in orthodox statistical inference corresponds
nicely to the same dichotomy adopted above in section
III B between the theoretical roles played by the settings
a, b and outcomes A,B? However, in the context of Bell’s
notion of local causality we are not aiming at making an
inference about the settings a or b. Therefore we will
have to change the perspective somewhat.
There is an alternative approach to statistical infer-
ence, the Baysian approach, that does not rely on such a
strict division between events and parameters.
Bayesian statistical inference proceeds from a similar
point of view except that now one assumes the existence
of a so-called prior probability distribution over the pa-
rameter θ. Furthermore, the probability distributions
pθ(x) are now reinterpreted as conditional distributions
pθ(x) = p(x|θ) . (15)
Given these two assumptions, it is possible to provide a
so-called posterior probability distribution by means of
Bayes’ theorem, i.e.,
p(θ|x) = p(x|θ)ρ(θ)∫
dθp(x|θ)ρ(θ) . (16)
Extending this to the case of multiple, independent
and identically distributed trials one obtains:
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) =
∏n
i=1 pθ(xi)ρ(θ)∫ ∏n
i=1 pθ(xi)ρ(θ)dθ
. (17)
In the Bayesian approach, the goal of statistical infer-
ence is to report this posterior probability distribution.
Note that this viewpoint does not necessarily presuppose
a subjective interpretation of probability.
As stated before, sufficiency is an important notion re-
gardless of which precise approach to statistical inference
is chosen. In the Baysian approach this takes the follow-
ing form. Firstly, note that the transformation (9) re-
mains valid. Secondly, consider pˆ(θ|y1, . . . , yn) and note
that using Bayes Theorem this is equal to
pˆ(y1, . . . , yn|θ)ρ(θ)∫
pˆ(y1, . . . , yn|θ)ρ(θ)dθ . (18)
Then assuming y1 to be sufficient for θ, i.e., assuming
(14) obtains, we deduce that
pˆ(θ|y1, . . . , yn) = pˆθ(y1)gˆ(y1, . . . , yn)ρ(θ)∫
pˆθ(y1)gˆ(y1, . . . , yn)ρ(θ)dθ
=
pˆθ(y1)ρ(θ)∫
pˆθ(y1)ρ(θ)dθ
. (19)
Thus once the fundamental assumptions of Bayesian in-
ference are in place, the sufficiency condition is entirely
equivalent to
pˆ(θ|y1, . . . yn) = pˆ(θ|y1) (20)
Perhaps, this makes the underlying motivation of suffi-
ciency even clearer: if the above condition holds, then the
probability of θ, once y1 is given, is not changed when
the values of y2, . . . , yn are included. These additional
functions of the data are irrelevant or redundant for the
purpose of assigning the posterior probability. In accor-
dance with the above terminology, this is expressed as:
y1 is sufficient for the purpose of rendering some set of
other variables redundant relative to a class of variables
Ry = {y1, . . . , yn}.
It should also now be clear how this condition would
fit in with the usual Bell-type framework we have been
sketching in the section II (e.g., see Fig. 3). First of all,
we will suppose the condition (20) to hold for each of
the probability distributions labeled by the settings a, b.
Secondly, λ will play the role of y1, and each of the yi
(i 6= 1) should be one of the other random variables in
the candidate theory in question, for example one of the
settings A,B, or some other beable specification λ′. The
role Ry is thus taken over by Rλ. Thirdly, θ is one of the
outcomes A,B.
Now, although obviously λ is not a datum nor a func-
tion of the data, it is still assumed to be a random vari-
able. It has a value, and although it will in general be
hidden for us we can reason about the hypothetical case
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that we would know its value. Perhaps one might won-
der if the identification θ with the outcomes A,B is a
valid move to make. After all, we have introduced the
variables y1, . . . , yn as functions on the space of outcomes
Xn, whereas θ labelled probability distributions. But in
a Baysian approach this distinction does not count as
fundamental anymore. As is clear from (20) we are ba-
sically dealing with probability distributions on Θ×Xn,
and both θ and yi can be seen as functions on this larger
space.
By now we have gathered enough mathematically clean
and precise tools to explicate Bells’ intuitive notion of
local causality, and this will be carefully outlined in the
next section.
V. THE BABY: BELL’S LOCAL CAUSALITY
‘MATHEMATICALLY SHARP AND CLEAN’
Recall that our analysis of sufficiency showed that such
a requirement for physical theories implies that certain
variables should be sufficient (in one of the two senses
given above) for a particular purpose relative to a spe-
cific class of variables. We have argued that then (6)
and (20) can be obtained as mathematical criteria when
dealing with, respectively, labels attached to functions
and random variables that are to be conditioned on.
In Bell’s conditionn of local causality it is the beable
specification λ that is supposed to be sufficient. Thus in
order to analyse this condition as a sufficiency criterion,
we must, firstly, indicate the purpose for which λ is suffi-
cient (per requirement β1 and β2) and, secondly, indicate
relative to which beable class this is so, i.e., to indicate
the range Rλ of allowable λ (per requirement α).
We believe that by now it should come as no surprise
that our proposal is the following: Consider again Fig.
2. A candidate theory will be said to be locally causal
when, if region 1 is space-like separated from region 2,
the theory provides a specification λ in a region 3 that
shields off region 2 from the overlap of the back-ward
light cones of 1 and 2, that is sufficient, in the sense of
(6) and (20), for the purpose of rendering the beables in
the far-away region 2 redundant for the task of predicting
the probabilities of events in region 1, where λ is relative
to the class of all allowable beable specifications that can
be given about a region 3 (according to the candidate
theory and consistent with the ‘free variables’ assump-
tion), i.e., Rλ contains all allowable beable specifications
in this region 3.
If we now apply this to the standard bi-partite setup of
Fig. 3 we obtain that if the candidate theory in question
obeys local causality then the theory provides a beables
specification λ in region 3a that is sufficient for the pur-
pose of rendering the far-away outcome B and setting b
redundant for the task of determining the probabilities of
obtaining A, and this is so relative to all other allowable
beable specifications Rλ the candidate theory in question
provides for region 3a. Using the results of the previous
section this entails that functional sufficiency (6) renders
the label b and statistical sufficiency (20) the random
variable B redundant for prediction of Pa,b(A|B, λ). For
determining the probability of obtaining outcome B a
completely analogous analysis obtains so that we finally
get the mathematically sharp and clean formulation of
the condition of local causality:
Pa,b(A|B, λ) = Pa(A|λ),
Pa,b(B|A, λ) = Pb(B|λ), (21)
from which one trivially obtains factorisability:
Pa,b(A,B|λ) = Pa(A|λ)Pb(B|λ). (22)
Although rather similar to (1), which in section II was
claimed to be the mathematical expression of the condi-
tion local causality, the differences and alternative deriva-
tion are crucial.
VI. NOT THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH
THE BATHWATER
A. Remarks
(one) All this might look like an overcomplicated way to
obtain the already well-known, i.e., something similar to
(1), but we have in fact obtained quite a lot: a mathemat-
ically clean formulation (21) that brings to the forefront
crucial aspects otherwise left out. The formalisation,
firstly, encodes the particular notions of sufficiency and
redundancy that are involved, secondly, incorporates the
theoretical distinction between outcomes (random vari-
ables) and settings (labels) enforced by the ‘free variables’
assumption, and finally, indicates rigourously where the
constraints set by the notions of locality and causality
enter the mathematical formalisation.
This latter point has not been stressed before and
needs some elaboration. Note that the mathematical
formalisation of sufficiency itself needs no requirement
what so ever of locality or causality, as can be deduced
from the formal analysis of section IV. We must thus
look elsewhere, and here is our proposal. When applying
both statistical and functional sufficiency to the setup of
Fig. 3, requirements of locality and causation necessarily
come in play when fullfilling the requirements (α) and
(β1) and (β2) of section IIIA, page 7.
Firstly, it is by an appeal to the principle that causality
can only be local in the sense of Fig. 1, that the purpose
for which λ is sufficient is specified. Indeed, because lo-
cal causality stipulates that causes operating in a certain
region in space-time must lie in the backward light cone
of that region and effects of anything occuring in that re-
gion can only lie in its forward light cone, we get the in-
ference that anything outside the backward and forward
light cone of that particular space-time region should be
causally redundant. See Fig. 1 and the very first quote
by Bell in section II. But in order to distinguish mere
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correlation from causal influence, it is, secondly, that the
range Rλ of allowable beable specifications is restricted
by considerations regarding locality and causality. The
beables in Rλ must lie in a spacetime region with specific
characteristics, namely it must shield off the overlap of
the light cones of region 1 and 2 from these same regions
1 and 2. The possibility of spurious violations of local
causality mentioned in remark (iii) on page 4 is in this
way eliminated.
In conclusion, local causality is not a mere statisti-
cal no-correlations requirement; to the contrary, it has a
substantial relation to the relativistic causal structure of
Fig. 2. See also Norsen (2007, [15]) who extensively ar-
gues for this point. According to our analysis presented
here, Bell’s condition of local causality is a special form of
statistical and functional sufficiency, where the purpose
for which λ is claimed to be sufficient, and the range of
validity (the class Rλ of beable specifications to which it
is relative) are motivated by locality and causality con-
straints.
It is important to realize that the notions of locality
and causality referred to here involve nothing but the
special relativistic causal structure as exemplified in the
light cone structure of Fig. 1. Importantly, there is
no need for some philosophical theory of causation or
an appeal to the problematic notion of Reichenbach’s
Principle of the Common Cause, or the like (see also
Norsen (2007, [15])).
(two) It is only λ that is supposed to be sufficient, and
not λ plus one or both of the settings. Of course the
settings a and b are needed to determine the outcomes
A and B respectively, but, remember, prediction of
outcomes of measurement is not the purpose for which
λ is supposed to be sufficient!
As was mentioned in footnote 6, Norsen (2007 [15],
2009 [16]) does include the local setting in the specifi-
cation of the beables that are supposed to render some
other beables in a space-like separated region redundant.
However, this is not needed, and in fact even unwanted20.
For, after all, what should be in Rλ? Only those beables
whose causal past could be correlated, in the sense of
Fig. 1 and according to the candidate theory in question,
to the causal past of the beables that are to be rendered
redundant, i.e., the beables in region 2, such as B, b. Be-
ing free variables the local settings should thus not be in
Rλ, as the following example shows.
If including a in the beable specification of region 3
could be relevant to render b, B in region 2 redundant
for prediction of the probability to obtain A, then
there needs to be a genuine possibility in the candidate
theory under study for correlations between the causal
past of a and the events in region 2 (see Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3). However, this is excluded by the ‘free variables’
20 Also, it should be mentioned that Bell himself explicitly refrains
from doing this. See Fig. (6.6) of Bell (1990 [9, p. 108]).
assumption. We can think of a being chosen at the
very last instant, and therefore (in any locally causal
theory) a can make no difference as to whether beables
in space-like separated region 2 are, or are not redun-
dant for prediction of obtaining outcome A in region
1. Furthermore, from a mathematical point of view,
including a in Rλ makes no difference and is therefore
better left out.
(three) One could proceed in a two step proce-
dure to obtain the mathematical formulation of local
causality (21) and the condition of factorisability (22),
by firstly requiring statistical sufficiency (6) so as to
obtain,
Pa,b(A|B, λ) = Pa,b(A|λ) ,
Pa,b(B|A, λ) = Pa,b(B|λ) , (23)
and only then functional sufficiency (20) to subsequently
get:
Pa,b(A|λ) = Pa(A|λ) ,
Pa,b(B|λ) = Pb(B|λ) . (24)
These two requirements together indeed imply (21) and
(22).
It might be tempting to think of each of these two
conditions (23) and (24) as implementing a different
weaker assumption than local causality itself. For after
all it is the conjunction of the two that gives the desired
condition (21). Logically this is indeed true. But despite
this theoretical difference, the physical status of the two
conditions is exactly the same. Both are a consequence
of local causality, and the appeal to notions of locality
and causality used in implementing the functional and
statistical sufficiency are just the same, see remark
(one) above. Elsewhere this will be further argued for
(Seevinck & Uffink, 2010, [18]) and the comparison to
a similar famous two-step procedure by Jarrett (1984,
[14]) and Shimony (1984, [19]) will be there presented.
(four) Orthodox quantum mechanics violates (22).
Indeed, as is well-known, the quantum mechanical
predictions using the singlet state can be easily used to
provide such a violation. A closer look reveals that the
theory violates statistical sufficiency because it violates
(23), but it obeys (24) and thereby functional sufficiency.
From this we can conclude that quantum mechanics
does not provide a beable specification λ in region 3 with
the correct characteristics, i.e., the theory is unable to
provide a specification of beables in any appropriate re-
gion 3 such that the outcome B always becomes redun-
dant for the probability of determining outcome A.
It is tempting to draw more grand conclusions than
this one, say, of a somewhat foundational, philosophical
or meta-physical nature. We will refrain from doing
that here, but in remark (six) below we will address the
controversial question of what legitimate conclusions can
be drawn from violations of local causality.
13
(five) The qualification of the class of beables Rλ
is essential because we must carefully ensure that no
spurious violations of local causality are allowed for,
and at the same time that we do not encode too much
in the specification λ so as to come into conflict with
the ‘free variables’ assumption. Therefore, as was
shown earlier, the specification cannot be taken to be
complete, as some free variables must probably be left
out, yet it must be allowed to range over all other
beable specifications the candidate theory in question
allows for. This justifies calling the specification of λ
‘sufficiently complete’, meaning that nothing causally
relevant that is not ‘free’ from the candidate theory
under consideration is left out, without claiming the
specification to be complete in the sense that everything
in the theory is included, including the free variables.
This ensures that the spurious violations of remark (iii)
and (iv) can not occur, and that local causality is not
just a mere no-correlations condition.
(six) Suppose (21) fails, how are we to interpret
this? Well, given our remarks above, there seems to be
only one option, namely that local causality is violated,
i.e., there must be some non-local causation present in
the candidate theory under study.
We cannot blaim a violation of (21) on the specification
λ not being sufficiently well-specified, for as was just ar-
gued in remark (five) above, Rλ ranges over all allowable
beable descriptions and should be regarded ‘sufficiently
complete’.
Nor can we blaim such a violation on the existence
of ‘locally explicable’ correlations. The space-time struc-
ture of Fig. 3 and the further specification of local causal-
ity via the notion of sufficiency, including the require-
ments (α), (β1) and (β2), excludes any spurious viola-
tions of (21) due to correlations that do allow a locally
causal explanation. This we argued for in section III.
The question then arises what it (philosophically,
meta-physically) means for local causality to be violated.
Such an investigation will be performed elsewhere [18].
As a final remark we wish to present a point made by
Norsen (2009, [16, p. 12])21 concerning a violation of (21):
“It isn’t necessarily that something in region 2 is causally
influencing something in region 1, or vice versa. It is
always possible that there is some other event, neither
in region 1 nor region 2, which was not determined by
[λ], and which itself causally influences both [beables in
region 1] and [in region 2]. The point is, though, that this
causal influence would have to be non-local (i.e., would
have to violate the special relativistic causal structure
sketched in [Fig. 2].”
VII. ENVOI
Have we thrown out the baby with the bathwater? We
believe not, as our cleaning up of the intuitive idea of
local causality for mathematics has proven to be fruitful
and to clarify hitherto unknown aspects of the notion
of local causality. It should be seen as a complement
to Norsen’s manuscripts (2007 [15], 2009 [16]) taking his
analysis a step further.
Also, we believe that our mathematical formalisation
of Bell’s notion of local causality further unearths its rich
conceptual background, and that it thereby brings us a
bit closer to answering the hard and open foundational
questions that arise from attempts to incorporate viola-
tions of local causality into our physical worldview.
What critical light this novel mathematical formalisa-
tion throws on other interpretation and motivations of
Bell’s notion of local causality is still to be worked out.
This we hope to unearth in the near future (Seevinck &
Uffink, 2010, [18]).
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